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Abstract 
The dam collapse in Santa Lucia (Atlántico) during the intense rains of 2010-2011 
in Colombia resulted in one of the worst floods on national record. Six 
municipalities were completely covered by water from the Canal del Dique, an 
artificial branch of the Magdalena River. Santa Lucia was one of the municipalities 
that suffered from the flooding, with large economic and social impact across the 
region.   
 
This research aims to present and explore local narratives about the disaster, told 
by inhabitants of Santa Lucia. The concept of narrative, understands their stories as 
deeply embedded in the political, economic, social and environmental context.  
Using concepts like marginality, subalternity and liminality, this research unpacks 
different elements of the story, revealing tensions and power relations present in 
the pre-disaster and post-disaster contexts in Santa Lucia. 
 
In its conclusion, this research uses the concept of a meta-narrative, as a 
reformulation of the story, presenting the disaster as part of a story of 
transformation, shock and reshaping of the Santa Lucia landscape, in which – per 
Oliver-Smith’s work - vulnerability emerges as an uneven distribution of risk 
among individuals. 
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Introduction 
On November 30th 2010, one of the worst floods in the history of Colombia 
took place. The waters from the Canal del Dique - an artificial canal branch 
of the Magdalena River- surged as a result of the most intense rainy season 
in the country’s recent history, breaking the dam and entering the lowlands. 
Five municipalities in the department of Atlántico, in the north of Colombia, 
were completely covered by water. Most of them remained underwater for 
months. Houses, crops and animals were destroyed, damaged or lost. Life in 
those municipalities wasn’t the same after the disaster. 
 
Santa Lucia, a municipality located on the riverbanks of the Canal del 
Dique, was one of the most affected by the flood. It was also the location of 
the dam’s first rupture. This research document discusses how people from 
Santa Lucia narrate this disaster; the story they tell about the flooding that 
changed their life. Yet, this research doesn’t simply aim to find that story 
but also to explore why people tell that particular story. Avoiding clever or 
distorted word games, the main objective of this research is to find the local 
narratives which emerge from the 2010-2011 flood in the municipality of 
Santa Lucia, and to identify the kind of contextual elements (e.g.: historical, 
politic, economic) that help shape, explain and determine this narrative.      
 
Before we move on, we must ask the questions: Why should we study 
disaster?  First, disasters are complex phenomena, which emerge as 
opportune spaces for exploring different aspects of social reality. Disaster 
reveals social inequalities, exposes the core of the social repertoire of a 
society - in its physical and moral dimensions - and opens spaces for the 
reformulation of established power arrangements.  
 
Defining disasters can be challenging in terms of the complexity of the 
phenomenon and its definition is still called into strong academic debate 
(Oliver-Smith, 1999). Yet three main elements remain crucial to 
understanding the social science – particularly anthropological - approach to 
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disaster. First, disasters must be understood as an ongoing relationship 
between societies and the environment in which they exist. In this regard, 
certain adaptation strategies are established by every society, in which risks 
are not evenly shared throughout the social structure (Oliver-Smith, 2004). 
Second, disasters need to be understood as a process/event (Oliver-Smith, 
1999). Disasters should be seen as processes that occur due to a particular 
set of ongoing relationships between a society and its environment. At the 
same time, disasters are also events which impact over ongoing process 
must be acknowledged. Finally, disasters are totalizing events; they are 
temporary spaces in which different dimensions of social life are 
simultaneously shocked (Oliver-Smith, 1996).  
 
Furthermore, what is the importance of studying the narratives of disasters? 
Disaster survivors’ narratives emerge as an important object of study. 
Beyond a chronological account of the events, narratives are society’s 
attempt to find a coherent story and meaning that can be used to position the 
disaster in the symbolic social order (Zizek, 2003:104). Narratives about 
disaster are deeply embedded in the societal context, and shaped by ideas, 
concepts and references at the core of the society in question.  
 
It is also worth noting the difference between survivors’ narratives – which 
are examined in this research as local narratives – and other types of 
narratives surrounding disaster, especially the state’s official narrative. 
Official narratives about disaster traverse public policy, guide humanitarian 
assistance in the reconstruction phase, and mediate various actors’ access to 
assistance-related resources. As Hewitt warns, this official narrative is 
mainly dominated by academic disciplines in which “persons, communities 
and their concerns must be reduced to mass, collective units, statistically 
distributed data points, and function of abstract dimension” (Hewitt, 1995: 
321).  
 
In this matter, this research aims to make local narratives visible, to position 
them as valid objects of study in disasters. Moreover, separate from its 
academic purposes, this research aims to tell the other part of the story: the 
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one that is often eclipsed by the hegemonic official state narrative. This 
work starts to return a human face to the statistical figures into which people 
have been transformed. According to Hewitt, “the work of recovering and 
listening to oral testimonies from the victims of calamity goes to the heart of 
the problem of finding the human and the social in risk and disaster” 
(Hewitt, 1995: 329)  
 
How does this research relate to topics of rural change or natural resource 
management, as guiding elements from SLU Master’s in Rural 
Development and Natural Resource Management? This research combines 
both elements.  Disasters, as manifestations of ongoing relationships 
between society and its environment, are specific situations – events – in a 
particular natural resource management history. The responsibility for the 
disaster in Santa Lucia lies in the Canal del Dique, an artificial channel, 
which history proves is at the core of the natural resource elements that 
made the disaster possible.   
 
On the other hand, throughout history disasters have been catalyzers of rural 
change. Disaster, as a totalizing event¸ produces inevitable change in 
societies by transforming their landscapes and livelihoods. Santa Lucia, the 
municipality on which this research focuses, also experienced the massive 
transformation that disaster can generate in rural contexts. Nowadays, 
phenomenon like climate change will materialize into different type of 
disasters (e.g.: floods, droughts), which increasingly hit rural areas, 
threatening the livelihood of communities largely dependent on agriculture 
(Davis et al, 2009). Disasters are, and will be, inevitable realities faced by 
rural areas across the globe. This research can therefore be read as a story 
about both a particular set of decisions regarding the managing of the 
natural resource that made a disaster inevitable; and about how a disaster 
can shape rural change in a marginal place.  
 
This document is divided into four parts. I. General Framework, introduces 
the research question and methodology which guide the fieldwork and 
information analysis. It also includes general contextual information about 
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Santa Lucia and the main events of the disaster. II. Local narrative about 
the 2010-2011 flooding of Santa Lucia will present local narratives gathered 
during fieldwork in the municipality. III. Exploring the narrative, conducts 
various forms of analysis of the narrative, including: a) an exploration of the 
construction of meanings that underline the narrative of the disaster; b) the 
process of transformation of the landscape; c) an examination of the concept 
of “criminal hands” and the representation of the neighbor municipality of 
Calamar; d) an analysis of the idea of “winners and losers” after the disaster 
in the municipality, based on the concept of liminatily ; and e) an 
exploration of the configuration of local political power after the disaster. 
Conclusions present a meta-narrative about the disaster, which emerges 
from the different elements analyzed in this research. 
 
I. General framework 
This chapter presents general elements of the research, including: the 
research question which guides this work; the theoretical framework upon 
which the work is based; the methodology followed during the research and 
analysis; and general context about the municipality, the disaster and its 
main events. 
 
A. Research question 
The research question that guides this research is:  What kind of narratives 
emerge at the local level, in the municipality Santa Lucia (Colombia) 
regarding the flood of 2010-2011, and how can these narratives be explored 
and explained as embedded in the political, social, economic, cultural and 
ecological context of municipality? 
 
B. Theoretical framework 
Social scientists have been highly critical about the disciplines that have 
historically monopolized the study of disasters.  Based on purely physical 
and statistical approaches, these disciplines have overlooked the social 
dimensions of disasters (Hewitt, 1995: 321). From a social science 
perspective, disasters must be considered as part of the ongoing relationship 
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between society and the environment, with a “large framework of historical 
and structural process” (Oliver-Smith, 1996: 314).  Even from social science 
perspectives, which – to varying degrees - share common ground in disaster 
research, the production of overall consensus remains challenging due to the 
complexity embodied by disaster phenomena (Oliver-Smith, 1999:19). Four 
central ideas emerge as central to studying disasters: a) disasters as part of 
the ongoing relationships between societies and their environment b) 
disasters as process/event; c) disasters as totalizing events; and d) narratives 
of disasters as a social need for positioning the event in the symbolic order.  
 
First, this paper will discuss disasters as ongoing processes between 
societies and their environment. This ongoing process is marked by adaptive 
strategies, which must be seen as way to prevent or respond to calamities, 
but unable to completely eliminate all sort of hazards. Specific ways of 
prioritizing adaptive strategies respond to the composition of power 
relations in a particular society, rather than to purely biological needs 
(Oliver-Smith, 1999: 26).  Disasters emerge as a failure of the adaptive 
strategy, making them the realization of vulnerability. Therefore, individuals 
who live in situations of vulnerability are more exposed to disasters and less 
likely to be integrated into the adaptive strategies formulated within the 
society’s established socio-economic structure. Ethnographic research has 
proven that “social stratification within a community promotes unequal 
distribution of risk and allocation of resources between the community 
members” (Ullberg, 2014: 8). 
 
Second, disasters as process/event. The idea of conceptualizing disasters as 
process/event helps to examine the different levels and temporalities that 
comprise the complexity of the phenomenon. Disasters are the result of the 
historical processes in which they are made possible.  
 
In this respect, the concept of vulnerability is connected to the 
conceptualization of disasters as a process.  According to Oliver-Smith, “a 
disaster is made inevitable by the historically produced pattern of 
vulnerability, evidence in the location, infrastructure, sociopolitical 
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structure, production patterns and ideology, which characterize a society” 
(1999:29).  Nonetheless, disasters also emerge from events. In this matter, 
disasters are not only part of the process, but also need to be seen as 
elements of transformation. Therefore, disasters “reconfigure on-going 
processes and thus change course of things in one way or another after they 
have occurred” (Ullberg, 2014:7).  
 
It is important to maintain this duality in the definition of the disaster as a 
process/event, and to avoid the risk of falling into misconception of the 
phenomenon. Understanding disaster as just a process leads to undeniable 
physical dimension of the event and the capacity of the phenomenon to 
produce transformations.  On the other hand, understanding disasters as just 
as an events, without seen the process dimension, “seems to incorporate an 
almost functionalist assumption of general societal equilibrium prior to 
disaster” (Oliver-Smith, 1999: 23). 
 
Third, disasters as totalizing events. The main idea here relies on the 
understanding of disasters as temporal spaces in which the social structure is 
shocked in different dimensions: economic, social, political and symbolic 
(Oliver-Smith, 1999:20). In this matter, disasters need to be interpreted as 
multidimensional phenomena in which all the elements that make up social 
life are disturbed simultaneously, creating a profound sense of chaos and 
disorder in daily life. As totalizing events, disasters are also potential spaces 
in which power arrangements in a society are examined (Oliver-Smith, 
1997: 309-310).    
 
Fourth, and finally, the society affected needs to create a narrative of the 
disaster. In this case, the core idea relies on human nature’s need to integrate 
overwhelming experiences such as disasters into the symbolic order, though 
narratives (Zizek, 1989).  Bode claims that “making destruction more 
tolerable to the spirit is perhaps what myths and explanations of disasters 
are all about” (1977:268).  Creating a narrative about what happens and why 
it happens is a common and profoundly revealing social practice after any 
disaster. Narratives about disaster are the best portrait of “the moral and 
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ethical core of the belief system” of a society (Oliver-Smith, 1997:308) and 
should be examined as embedded in societal power arrangements. As 
Oliver-Smith affirms, “the linkage between concrete circumstances and 
ideological structure may be directly observed as people attempt to come to 
terms with disasters, to construct meaning and logic that enable them, as 
individuals or group, to understand what happened to them” (Oliver-Smith, 
2004:18). 
Moving aside from the conceptualization of disasters, this research will use 
three particular concepts to examine the local narrative of Santa Lucia: 
representation, subalternity and marginality. Representation is interpreted 
as a complete system of representation, organizing, gathering, arranging and 
classifying concepts and complex relationships between them (Hall, 
1997:16). Therefore, representation is a fundamental element for 
formulating world order and for individuals and societies to reflect upon it. 
 
In addition, and in connection with representation but with different 
purposes, this document will use the concepts of marginality and 
subalternity. The concept of marginality will be used to explain the 
relationship between Santa Lucia and the State.  In contrast, the concept of 
subalternity will highlight aspects of the relationship between Santa Lucia 
and its neighbor municipality, Calamar. The difference between Santa 
Lucia’s marginality and subalternatity with respect to the State and Calamar 
is marked by how each of the actors is represented to the Santa Lucians:  the 
image of the State is more of a link to political processes of citizenship 
recognition, while the image of Calamar is linked to moral reflection.  
 
Subalternity refers to the “relational position in a conceptualization of 
power” (Paldney, 2006). Without entering extended debate on the concept, 
this paper will rework Paldney’s definition and use subalternity to 
understand the historical position in which individuals have been placed in 
uneven power relations.  In this matter, this concept of subalternity emerges 
from Antonio Gramsci’s work in Prison Notebook (Gramsci, 1971). 
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On the other hand, marginality here refers more to the notion of periphery 
and exclusion, in which certain individuals or territories are placed in the 
limits of the recognition of citizenship. Even without including a reification 
of the state, this concept of marginality is clearly related to the 
materialization of a particular State presence in those peripheries and the 
way in which the individuals present in those marginal territories are think 
and intervene by State narratives and technologies (Das and Poole, 2008). 
  
C. Methodology 
This research is based on ethnographic methodology with the use of 
interviews and participatory observation in the municipality of Santa Lucia, 
with a total of three weeks of fieldwork in Santa Lucia, Calamar, Campo de 
la Cruz and Barranquilla. Semi-structured interviews were conducted in 
Santa Lucia, most of them in groups of two to five people. The group 
selected for interview aimed to incorporate the widest possible sample to 
integrate variables such as gender, class and age.  Participatory observation 
was also conducted by spending time with community members in their 
daily routines. In the other locations mentioned (Calamar, Campo de la Cruz 
and Barranquilla) interviews or participatory observation were conducted.     
 
Methodologically, the concept of narrative guides the entire research work. 
This concept, taken from literature theory, refers to the understanding of 
particular stories through which societies organize and make sense of their 
reality. In this matter, Czarniawska claims that “to understand a society or 
some part of a society, it is important to discover its repertoire of legitimate 
stories and find out how it evolved“(2004:5).  
 
Three interconnected elements remain central to the concept of narrative: 
intentionality, plot and validity.  Starting with the idea of intentionality, 
narrative is a way in which experiences can be organized “with the help of a 
scheme assuming the intentionality of human action” (Czarniawska, 
2004:7).  Narratives ensure that different events can be integrated into the 
symbolic order, taking into account that there was a particular human (or 
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mystical) action that helped to shape the particular set of the reality.   
Therefore, “explanations are possible because there is a certain teleology –
sense of purpose- in all lived narratives (Czarniawska, 2004: 13). 
 
Moving on to the idea of plot, narratives go beyond the simple 
chronological review or expression of events.  A narrative needs a plot that 
explicitly states and explains relationships that emerge between these 
events. Czarniawska claims that “usually plots are much more complicated 
and contain chains of actions and events, oscillating states of affairs, 
apparent actions, and wrongly interpreted events, as in suspense or mystery, 
but a minimal plot is enough to make sense of a narrative” (2004:19).  The 
existence of a narrative is therefore based on the existence of a plot -in 
which a relationship emerges between different events- rather than for the 
level of complexity of the story itself. 
 
Finally, regarding the idea of validity, when exploring narrative the concept 
of validity emergence is used here as a guiding criteria, but not in the usual 
sense. According to Czarniawska, “it is the plot rather than the truth or 
falsity of story element that determines the power of a narrative as a story” 
(Czarniawska, 2004:8). When considering a narrative, the question that 
should therefore be formulated is not whether the narrative is true or false, 
but rather what kind of context can make this certain narrative possible.   
 
The methodological approach to this research and its different stages is 
therefore framed around this concept of narrative. At the beginning of the 
research, semi-structured interviews were used to ask survivors about their 
experience of the disaster. Chronological questions (or what questions) 
were asked with the goal of establishing a timeline of the disaster. In 
addition, a group of interpretative questions (or why questions) aimed to 
encourage people to make a connection between the different events stated.  
Even though one could argue that a blurry line exists between chronological 
and interpretation questions as a certain chronological order is also 
influenced by the interpretation approach, at a practical level this overlap 
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does not influence the capacity to advance exploration of the narrative of 
the disaster.     
 
During the later analytical stage of the research, the interviews and 
participatory observation data was systematized into a narrative panel, 
which presents elements shared by the interviewees, and is guided by 
Ullberg’s interpretation of the Malkki method (Ullberg, 2014: 77). Through 
this method, a common narrative emerges. The following step consisted of 
identifying core elements of the narrative and contextualizing them from a 
political, economic, social and ecological standpoint. This exploration 
resulted in the formulation of a meta-narrative that aimed to create a 
coherent narrative about the different elements that were analyzed more 
closely.   
D. Context  
The municipality of Santa Lucia is located in the Atlántico department in 
northern Colombia. Santa Lucia borders the municipalities of Manatí, Suan 
and Campo de la Cruz (also part of the department of Atlántico), and the 
Canal del Dique to the south.  
 
Similar to many of Atlántico’s southern municipalities, Santa Lucia has 
historically suffered from widespread social problems rooted in the high 
levels of poverty, lack of public services and the general absence of state 
institutions. As of 2010, the total population of Santa Lucia municipality 
was 11,947 inhabitants. According to official figures, 60% of the population 
in the municipality was below the poverty line. Only 27% of the inhabitants 
are served by the sewer system. Illiteracy of children between five and 15 
years old is at 16%, and from 15 to 18 years old it is 3% (DANE, 2010). 
With regards to unemployment, only 18.59% of the population was 
considered economically active, with one of the worst unemployment rates 
in Atlántico department (Sanchez Jabba, 2012: 23).     
 
The Canal del Dique constitutes a vital part of Santa Lucia’s social life. The 
Canal del Dique is an artificial navigable channel, whose construction 
began in the sixteenth century and whose length has now reached 155 Km, 
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from Calamar (Bolivar department) to Cartagena de Indias (Bolivar 
department). This Canal is strategically essential for the transportation and 
export of resources (mainly oil) from the regions that border the Magdalena 
River and the port area. The Canal del Dique transports 80% of the 
2,200,000 tonnes that move through the Magdalena River per year (BID and 
CEPAL 2012:193). 
 
Municipalities in the south of Atlántico - especially Santa Lucia - were 
catapulted into the national headlines in November 2010, after the Canal del 
Dique dam broke, flooding five municipalities and affecting many others. 
This disaster took place during a national state of emergency, which had 
been declared due to the unusually intense rainy season of 2010-2011, 
called the Ola Invernal, which left a path of destruction all across 
Colombia1. 
 
On the afternoon of November 30th 2010, on the road that connects the 
municipality of Calamar and Suan with Santa Lucia, the dam broke creating 
a hole through which water from the Canal entered the lowlands, affecting 
close to 200,000 people (BID and CEPAL, 2011: 56). The Canal was 
overflowing due to the increasing and constant rain, and the strong flow 
caused the hole to grow until it reached 238 meters in width. It was only on 
January 25th 2011 that the dam was finally closed, after more than 2,200 
million cubic meters of water had entered in the lowlands (Sanchez Jabba, 
2012:10). 
 
Official reports highlight the extraordinary phenomenon and the impact of 
the Ola Invernal, “this emergency was completely abnormal, affecting a big 
part of the country and with severe impact at economic, social and 
environmental level” (BID and CEPAL, 2012: 14). More than 3 million 
people across the country were affected by floodings or landslides, 2.3 
1 More than 3 million people across the country were affected by floods or landslides, 2.3 
million directly affected by destruction of properties and loss of their sources of productive 
income. (BID and CEPAL, 2012: 27). The scale of the damage led the Colombian 
government to declare a national emergency for economic, social and environmental 
reasons (CIDHUM, 2014: 37). 
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million directly affected by destruction of properties and loss of their 
production. (BID and CEPAL, 2012: 27). The scale of the damage led 
Colombian government to declare a national emergency for economic, 
social and environmental reasons (UniNorte, 2014: 37). 
 
The municipalities in the south of Atlántico were heavily affected by the 
disaster. Some municipalities such as Santa Lucia and Campo de la Cruz, 
were underwater for weeks (Sánchez Jabba, 2012:12). The damage 
exacerbated the high levels of poverty in affected areas and had a 
detrimental effect on the local economy, which is highly dependent on 
agriculture (BID and CEPAL, 2011:56). Official figures show that close to 
30,000 hectares of crops were affected in the region. In terms of livestock, 
close to 70,000 animals (mostly cattle and pigs) were affected, with more 
than 10% dying from drowning or during transportation (Sanchez Jabba, 
2012: 15). 
 
In Santa Lucia, the impact of the disaster was overwhelming.  The water 
covered 100% of the municipality, with official figures showing affectation 
to 2,000 houses. All six local schools were acutely affected, leaving the 
municipality without any educational institutions. At an economic level, 
1,300 hectares were flooded, destroying crops and livestock. According to 
official records, 81.57% of the households in the municipality reported loss 
of livestock and 30.3% reported loss of crops (Sanchez Jabba, 2012: 22). 
 
For the Colombian state, the official narrative that followed the dam rupture 
was framed in the bigger picture of the Ola Invernal. Furthermore, the 
official narrative presents climate change as the main element that clearly 
underlines all the disasters that the Ola Invernal produced across Colombia 
at the end of 2010 and beginning of 2011.  Official reports highlight the 
extraordinary impact of the Ola Invernal: “this emergency was completely 
abnormal, affecting a big part of the country and with severe impact at 
economic, social and environmental levels” (BID and CEPAL, 2012: 14).   
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However, the state narrative conceived of the Ola Invernal as both a disaster 
and a possibility. Destruction, for the National Development Plan of 2010-
2014, was considered a possibility for reconstruction and an opportunity for 
the State to create a presence in historically marginalized areas of the 
country, while preparing for additional impact of climate change in the 
territory (PND, 2011). 
 
Probably the best portrait of the official narrative was the speech of 
Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos Calderon, at the inauguration of 
the municipal school on March 6th 2015.  After mentioning that he was the 
first Colombian president to visit Santa Lucia, President Santos said,   
I made a promise. I told Colombians: let´s try to benefit from this difficult situation, 
this crisis (…) to see if we can, after several years, be better than we were before the 
natural disaster - probably the worst in the country’s recent history. And it is so good 
to come to Santa Lucia and witness that the dream was accomplished. Who would 
have imagined? And I ask the parents here present, did you have such good quality 
schools for you children, four or five years ago? So we may say that we managed to 
take advantage of the disaster: it has changed the situation of many people. 
(Presidencia de la República, 2015)2.   
 
I. Local narrative of the flooding of 2010-2011 
 
This chapter presents the Santa Lucians’ narrative regarding the disaster. 
This narrative aims to present the results of the numerous interviews and 
observation conducted during fieldwork.  
 
Ola Invernal and the imminent disaster 
For Santa Lucians, the narrative about the disaster is rooted in the beginning 
of the Ola Invernal, when the Canal del Dique started increasing its level 
beyond that of the usual creciente3. While the locals started to notice the 
extraordinary increase in the water far beyond its usual levels, regional and 
municipal authorities remained completely passive toward the hazard that 
Santa Lucia was facing. People in the municipality still remember that days 
before the disaster, former Governor Eduardo Verano claimed that “the 
2Translated by the author   
3 Creciente is, for the locals, the period of the year with the highest precipitation and 
therefore the highest levels of water.  
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south of the Atlántico is shielded”4 against the Ola Invernal.  Former mayor 
of Santa Lucia, Osvaldo Santana, also failed to provide any kind of initiative 
to prevent the situation from worsening. The community therefore started 
organizing itself, alarmed by the levels of the Canal. 
 
The community started working in early November. The initial task was to 
reinforce four points of the dam in front of the town that had the highest 
possibility of collapsing. Rocks and sand bags were used to reinforce the 
sensitive points. Men, women, kids, elderly people, and even some pregnant 
women took part in the massive community effort to prevent the water from 
entering Santa Lucia. The bell tolls by the Church in the main square, 
sounding in the middle of the night or during the day, were the signal for the 
community to immediately go to a certain point and work to prevent the 
water from overflowing.  They cooked a communal sancocho5 and worked 
for hours.  The main fear was that if any of the points broke and let the 
water in, the town would be completely flooded in minutes. The anxiety 
among the people increased every time the bell called everyone to work. 
Meanwhile, not a single working machine was mobilized by the governor to 
support this community effort.  
 
The disaster materializes 
Finally, on the 30th of November 2010, the dam broke. The event didn’t take 
place at any of the four critical points on which the community had been 
working during the previous weeks. For the people of Santa Lucia, it was 
really suspicious that a high part of the dam, outside the town, and without 
any signs that threatened breakage, was the part that finally collapsed. In 
fact, Santa Lucians have heard a story about a motorcycle passing by just 
before the collapse, with people from the neighboring town of Calamar 
throwing a liquid called azogue6 into the road. People claim that, regardless 
4 “El sur del Atlántico está blindado” 
5 Colombian soup made of cassava, plantain and meat, chicken or fish 
6 Azogue is a liquid that people in Santa Lucia claim that can destroy pavement or even 
rocks. 
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of the imminent danger faced by the town, these “criminal hands”7 were the 
ones who actually caused the disaster. According to the story, the Calamar 
inhabitants’ motivation for this act was to save their own town from being 
completely erased by the water from the Magdalena River, if the pressure of 
the water wouldn’t be reduce by the dam break.   
 
Calamar8, which is located at the fork of the Magdalena River and the 
beginning of the Canal del Dique, saw the Magdalena River reach its 
highest historical level, rising so much that it threatened to break the 15-
meter wall that protects the town from the river. Calamar couldn’t resist one 
more week.  For Santa Lucians, Calamar was forced into a “them or us” 
decision, and people from Calamar decided to let Santa Lucia flood. After 
the dam broke, the levels of the Magdalena River decreased and Calamar 
was saved. People in Santa Lucia explained that no investigation about this 
matter was conducted by the authorities.  
 
Apart from the story of the “criminal hands”, there is general recognition of 
the disaster event as a sort of blessing. If the dam had broken in any of the 
places the community was expecting, the outcome would have been 
catastrophic. However, given the way that it did finally break, there weren’t 
any casualties. “We would not be telling this story if the dam had broken in 
front of the town. He [who put azogue in the road] was a decent criminal”, 
said one Santa Lucian.      
   
Regardless of actual responsibility for the incident, the floodwater initially 
did not surpass two meters in wide, and the community immediately 
responded. People desperately threw stones and sand bags, but the hole kept 
growing due to the strong flow of the channel during the Ola Invernal. 
Water entered directly into the lowland areas of Campo de la Cruz and 
Manatí municipalities, and then moved into the periphery neighborhoods of 
7 It is remarkable how people repeated the exact same expression of “criminal hands” 
without it being brought up in the interview questions. 
8 Calamar is a municipality within the department of Bolivar, with close to 22.000 
inhabitants, located just 20 Km from Santa Lucia. Calamar is an important trade center for 
all the municipalities that borders the Magdalena River and Canal del Dique.   
18 
 
                                                          
Santa Lucia, located on the other side of the road, and the rural area 
(corregimiento)9 of Algodonar.  Meanwhile, the road –acting like a dam- 
offered protection for the center of the town, to which many people from the 
flood-affected areas moved. Mayor Santana, without any effort to control 
the disaster, ran first to save his own livestock. Governor Verano arrived 
two days later, by which time the hole was close to 100 meters wide.  
 
“Mal vendiendo” 
The initial stage of the flood was one of the most painful moments for the 
Santa Lucians. Livestock and crops were the first to be lost. Santa Lucians 
started selling their livestock at any price to prevent losing them to 
drowning.  This phenomenon took place all across the flooded area in the 
south of the Atlántico. Lands were not part of the market. No-one in the 
town sold property.   
 
People were “mal vendiendo” (entering unfair business transactions 
between parts) all their animals at any price offered. There were strong 
emotional consequences for people in Santa Lucia who sold their animals 
for not even a quarter of their normal price. A woman mentioned “my 
husband sold a cow for 300,000 pesos (120 US dollars), and 5 days later, a 
cow that originally cost 3,000,000 pesos (1,200 US dollars) was sold for no 
more than 100,000 pesos (40 US dollars)”. People were “mal vendiendo” all 
their cattle, pigs and hens.  
 
There are also strong emotions associated with the particular buyers who 
arrived from Bolivar, Cesar and the northern municipalities of Atlántico to 
take part in this market, in which they benefited from the vulnerability of 
the townspeople. One Santa Lucian mentioned how “people took advantage 
of our need, but we couldn’t do anything at that time”. One older lady said, 
“it was so painful to see how the cattle, that we had because of the (hard 
work), sweat and suffering of my son in Venezuela, were sold for pennies”.   
 
9 Corregimiento is the territorial unit below the municipality, within the Colombian 
territorial legal management system. 
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The fight for Santa Lucia   
When the water had completely covered the lowlands of Manatí, Campo de 
la Cruz, Candelaria and the rural part of the municipality, it returned to 
Santa Lucia, with the road as the only protection. During the first week of 
December 2010, Santa Lucia was an island between two bodies of water: 
the Canal del Dique (south) and the flooded lands (north).  The people 
blocked all the bridges across the road to prevent the water from flooding 
the town. The community again gathered to reinforce the bridges. For some 
Santa Lucians, Mayor Santana lacked any commanding qualities and was 
completely paralyzed by nerves, claiming that “there is nothing you can do 
about nature”.  Yet, for others, Mayor Santana was actually eager to let the 
water enter the town so that all traces of the corruption during his 
administration would be erased. 
 
Meanwhile, the rain was another worry for the people in Santa Lucia. 
Completely surrounded by water, rain kept pouring down incessantly. With 
all the bridges blocked, there wasn’t a way for the rain water to leave the 
town, therefore flooding its lowest part. Around this time, people also 
started moving their belongings and anything they could save from their 
houses. They were desperate times, and people collected their most valuable 
possessions in their hands or in the few boxes that they could find during the 
chaos.   
 
The dimension of the hole in the dam outside Santa Lucia was now reaching 
200 meters, almost the width of the channel itself, with no solution in sight. 
It was clear to Santa Lucians that politicians and contractors involved in the 
area had no interest in fixing the damage. They named the gap the “boquete 
millonario” (the millionaire hole), as a way to describe the huge amount of 
resources than regional politicians and contractors were gaining from the 
disaster, and which would continue flowing if the disaster continued.    
 
On December 12th, a bridge collapsed. The water from the flooded area 
finally entered the town. This was, for Santa Lucia, the most shocking 
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moment experienced by its people. One recurring phrase among Santa 
Lucians regarding this moment is that, “even the manliest guy cried”10. This 
emotion is marked by the impotence of being completely surrounded by 
water without any way to stop it from entering the houses, and without 
being able to find a dry place for shelter. People gathered desperately 
waiting for a boat to take them out of the town. That day -December 12th - 
the rain suddenly stopped. The next day was the celebration of Santa Lucia, 
patron saint of the municipality. It took three days for the water to 
completely cover town.  
 
The only dry point within that massive water landscape was the road. People 
and animals shared a 3-meter wide road, taking the few things they were 
able to save and leaving a small space for some motorcycles to pass. Mayor 
Santana, in an act that some Santa Lucians qualify as “cowardice”, moved 
his office to Barranquilla, and “abandoned his responsibility for the town”. 
Those with nearby relatives or economic means moved to Barranquilla, 
other towns, or even Venezuela. The rest of the people were forced to move 
to the road or to Lomita Arena.  
 
Lomita Arena -which translates as little sand mountain- is a high place by 
the riverside, located at the other side of the channel, in the municipality of 
Calamar (Bolivar). The place’s name originates in its use as the dumping 
ground from previous dredging of the Canal.  More than 100 families from 
Santa Lucia found shelter from the flood in Lomita Arena.  
 
Even as humanitarian assistance was arriving, Lomita Arena was a difficult 
place in which to live. The high temperatures were exacerbated by the 
plastic cover of cambuches11, and there was a lot of wind, which covered 
everything including the food with sand made life in the shelter a challenge. 
There was no rainfall to relieve the situation during this period.    
 
10 “Hasta el más hombre lloró” 
11 Cambuche is a houses made of plastic and wood 
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Meanwhile, ransacking increased in the town. Santa Lucians blame their 
own neighbors for these incidents. One Santa Lucian mentioned “they didn’t 
feel any sorrow, they just started robbing”.  Houses abandoned during the 
flood were the target for ransacking. People lost TVs, fridges, cooking 
materials, furniture, and other items. One Santa Lucian affirmed that 
“people who had nothing then appeared with two TVs or three fridges. 
Everyone knew who they were but no-one did anything”. After a few days, 
the Colombian army entered and declared a curfew, warning people that 
they had orders to open fire on anyone found outside after sundown. Even to 
this day, the topic of looting is still an open wound among the Santa 
Lucians.  
 
The aid that started to appear revealed some characteristics of the town.  
One Santa Lucian stated that “for people who had never had anything, this 
[the food and other elements from the aid] was perfect”. Going a little 
deeper, another mentioned that “I started seeing people as if they were all 
chubby. I used to think that some people in Santa Lucia were skinny, but 
that wasn’t the case. People were starved”.   
 
Drying out and rebuilding the town 
On January 15th, three motor pumps were donated by the singer Shakira, to 
finish removing the water from the town. People started returning to clean 
their houses against the recommendation of state agencies, who warned 
about the health risks associated with the stagnant water. The residents’ 
potentially reckless action resulted from fear of a possible relocation effort 
instigated by the government. Santa Lucians emphatically refused to 
participate in any relocation effort. They feared that any sort of new house 
offered to them would not include a proper patio for their animals and 
crops. One Santa Lucian said “they [the State] want to relocate me, and even 
the whole town. But where am I going to find a house like mine, where I 
have a big patio in which I can have plants and animals? They won´t give us 
that”. 
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People outside the town center had to wait even more to start cleanup and 
renovations. Neighborhoods such as Pueblo Nuevo, located in the periphery 
of the town, were inundated by water until June 2011.  In the corregimiento 
of Algodonar, 10 Km from the town center, the floodwater remained until 
March.  
 
Problems with reconstruction also presented themselves at this time. 
Fundación Santo Domingo was chosen by the Colombian government as a 
partner to lead the reconstruction process in the municipality.  Many people 
complained about bad distribution of building materials. In contrast, others 
recognize the scale of assistance they received for reconstruction of their 
houses, including great quantities of building materials. However, in the 
corregimiento of Algodonar, a farmer argued that they haven’t seen the 
“Fundación Santo Domingo in more than three years” and that people 
started rebuilding using their own money because they grew tired of waiting 
for help.   
 
Throughout this reconstruction plan, the greatest shortage was in mental 
support for the survivors. After the disaster, many inhabitants didn’t recover 
from the shock. There wasn’t any kind of psychological support. A local 
fisherman told the story of his neighbor who “died from pure sorrow”.  
Other cases of depression were reported in Algodonar.  
 
A blessing and a curse 
When drawing conclusions about the disaster, people in Santa Lucia often 
think of it as a dual phenomenon: a blessing and a curse.  For an elderly 
lady, “the disaster was a blessing and a curse at the same time. First 
everything was sad but look at the town now: the hospital, the roads and the 
school. We didn’t have that before”. People tend to see the disaster as a 
blessing when pointing out the new infrastructure that Santa Lucia now has, 
that previously wasn’t even possible in the townspeople’s wildest dreams. 
The hospital, the roads, the sport facilities, the school: these are all results of 
the attention that the disaster attracted to Santa Lucia.   
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 That blessing is marked, and moreover personified, by the figure of the 
current governor of Atlántico, Jose Antonio Segebre. Among Santa Lucians, 
the Governor Segebre is incredibly popular, with some even claiming “the 
mayor of Santa Lucia is Governor Segebre”. They recognize Governor 
Segebre’s efforts to persuade Mayor Santana to work. However, as a local 
merchant said, “to make things work, sometimes he [Governor Segebre] 
needed to skip the mayor’s authority. It’s the only way”. 
 
On the other hand, the curse of the disaster is marked by the economic crisis 
that followed the destruction of agriculture and livestock. Those sectors, 
vital for Santa Lucians’ livelihood, were completely destroyed after the 
disaster. Fishing activity, another source of income, has almost disappeared. 
Nowadays, people in Santa Lucia sometimes need to go to Calamar to buy 
food supplies that were available in their town before the disaster. The 
losses in livestock represent a particularly acute difficulty for Santa Lucians, 
not only because they derive their livelihood from agriculture, but also 
because livestock is a form of saving money gained through remittances and 
work.      
 
In this general economic crisis, working in infrastructure construction 
remains the only employment opportunity in the municipality. Many in the 
municipality fear what will happen when the construction is over and no 
more employment for it is needed. One Santa Lucian claims, “What’s the 
good of having nice houses, a beautiful school, a beautiful hospital, a nice 
garden if we don’t have any food. Everything that I mentioned is really 
good, but with a full belly”. Another community leader mentions how “in 
Santa Lucia, most of the people who eat lunch don´t eat dinner”. 
 
The social and economic crisis in Venezuela made matters worse. 
Venezuela has historically been a destination for migrant workers from 
Santa Lucia, and the source of large remittances entering the municipality.  
Every house in Santa Lucia has family members who are living or have 
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lived in Venezuela. The depreciation of the Bolivar (the Venezuelan 
currency) has had impact on remittances in the municipality, so its economy 
has also weakened. In addition, the social unrest in Venezuela has made 
many people return to Santa Lucia. Many of those returning to the town are 
suspected of being part of the rising robbery and drug consumption there.       
 
Winners and losers 
For the people in Santa Lucia, the story of the disaster is also characterized 
by winners and losers. After the disaster, poor people and politicians were 
on the winning team. The rest are the losers. “The poor win, the rich lose”, 
stated one lady.  
 
The disaster was an opportunity for people living in extreme poverty, 
sometimes living in overcrowded or fragile bahareque12 houses, to obtain a 
decent home for their families. They also obtained food and goods (fridges, 
TVs, mattresses) that they wouldn’t have had the financial capacity to buy 
in the past.  On the other hand, people who had the capacity to satisfy their 
needs in the past, even with some difficulty, were now much worse off, 
especially if they had lost livestock.  In some cases, people in Santa Lucia 
claim that the disaster was even worse for the rich. One Santa Lucian 
expresses this feeling when saying, “the disaster made us all poor”.  
 
Local politicians were the other winners. Politicians got rich in new 
corruption schemes and gained greater control over local politics. Even 
when agreeing on the corruption and lack of action of the current 
administration, people consider that it would be difficult for the political 
elite in the municipality to change. Within the disaster context, corruption 
practices increased in the municipality13.  Large resources, aimed at helping 
12 Bahareque is a type of construction made up of mud and wood sticks. 
13 But probably the biggest corruption case was made with money that the Fondo de 
Adaptación gave to the municipality, as an additional help for the rebuild of the 
municipality.   
Some households were offered 1.500.000 pesos (600 USD) so they can do certain 
improvements to their houses. The problem was that none of that money reached any Santa 
Lucians. In a corruption scheme that involved the actual mayor, Teodomiro Ariza - the 
authorities created a false database, with people from Barranquilla, the northern 
municipalities of the department and even people living in Venezuela. Then they promised 
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the Santa Lucians, arrived in small quantities or didn’t arrive at all to those 
for whom they were intended. Other people mention how those benefits 
targeted only the employees of the municipality.    
 
Probably the biggest corruption case was conducted with money from the 
Fondo de Adaptación given to the municipality as an additional help to 
rebuild housing. Some households were supposed to be granted 1,500,000 
pesos (600 USD) for certain improvements to their homes. None of that 
money reached any Santa Lucians. Mayor Ariza is involved in this 
corruption scheme. Since the time that aid was being distributed, national 
oversight entities discovered the case and it is now under investigation. No-
one in Santa Lucia knows the amount of money involved in this corruption 
scheme.   
 
II. Interpreting the narrative  
 
As was mentioned previously, it is important to interpret the narrative on 
the basis of validity, not in terms of true or false but rather with a focus on 
understanding what kind of contextual elements made the narrative possible 
in the society in which it was created.  Narrative about disaster is a precious 
object of research due to its multiplicity of references, concepts and ideas, 
which people build to produce meaning about the destruction and suffering. 
In addition, the process of making sense out of the disaster is completely 
embedded in the specific social, political, cultural and economic 
characteristics of a society, revealing “the linkage between concrete 
circumstances and ideological structure” (Oliver-Smith, 2004:18).   
 
A large quantity of ideas, concepts and perceptions worth exploring lies 
throughout the narrative presented about the Santa Lucia flooding.  
However, the attention of this research will focus on five core elements that 
those people registered in the database between 300.000 (120 USD) and 500.000 (200 
USD) for being part of the corruption scheme. Finally the national oversight body 
discovered the case and it is now under investigation. No one in Santa Lucia is clear about 
the amount of money involved in this corruption scheme.   
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emerged and will help to expand and contextualize the narrative, framing 
the political, social, ecological, cultural or economic processes and events 
that make the people in Santa Lucia to consider this narrative as socially 
possible.  
 
This section will present those different elements. First, it will explore the 
construction of meaning, or general teleology that underlines the narrative 
of the disaster. Second, the chapter will analyze the process of 
transformation of the landscape and the emergence of vulnerability in Santa 
Lucia.  Third, it will examine the idea of “criminal hands” and Calamar 
municipality’s responsibility in the disaster. Fourth will come an analysis of 
the idea of “winners and losers” after the disaster in Santa Lucia. And 
finally, the chapter will explore the configuration and elements of local 
politics.        
 
A. What is the meaning of the disaster? 
A narrative must have an inner sense of purpose or teleology that helps the 
actors to make sense of the story. This notion focuses on the fact that what 
happens during the narrative (suffering, sorrow) was an essential element to 
produce an outcome. This sub-chapter will examine the meaning that Santa 
Lucia gives to the disaster.     
 
Not god´s work 
Spiritual leaders (priests and preachers) interviewed during fieldwork 
refused to give a pure divine interpretation of the disaster. They emphasized 
the political dimension and importance of the disaster for overcoming the 
historic poverty and state neglect in the municipality. All of them also 
expressed that the disaster was not a mystical experience for the people in 
the municipality, and that the churchgoers, remained the same in a pre-
disaster and post-disaster context.   
 
This lack of mystical interpretation runs across the different actors in the 
municipality. They failed to deliver that interpretation even when 
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deliberately asked for a mystical interpretation of the disaster, or when 
asked about the curious coincidence from a previous massive flood in Santa 
Lucia, in November 30th 1984. A smile, a joke, but nothing more.   
 
Besides the explicit reluctance to manifest a mystical interpretation of the 
disaster, there are also actions that prove that interpretation. The reluctance 
to give this disaster a mystical dimension is marked by the story of a 
Christian Church in the town that, exactly one year after the disaster, in 
November 2011, claimed that by December of the same year, the whole 
town would be completely destroyed. Despite the recent trauma in the 
municipality, nobody except the closest followers of the preacher 
abandoned the town. Some weeks later the members of the Church returned. 
 
Two interconnected elements lie in at the core of the Santa Lucians 
reluctantly for giving the disaster a mystical interpretation: a shared notion 
of the transformation of the landscape and the conception of the disaster as a 
chronical technical disaster.   
 
It is important to examine the shared notion of the experience of 
transformation of the landscape. This notion is gradually spread among 
people in Santa Lucia, especially from one age group to another. Some 
people can still remember places where the water was before the 
construction, before the road and the dam. They recall the places in which 
their fathers fished, some of them in the actual town14. This notion of 
transformation of the landscape among Santa Lucians is close to what 
Ullberg presents as memoryscape, in which the “spatiality of memory and 
the notion of landscape” interact (Ullberg, 2014: 14). 
 
Similar to the shared notion of transformation of the landscape is the 
experience of the disaster as a chronic technical disaster. This concept, 
developed by Kroll-Smith and Couch (1987), is used to describe “human 
origin disasters” that escalate chronically, originating in a failure to create 
14 This notion of the transformation of the landscape is expanded in the next sub-chapter “ 
B. the emergence of the vulnerability of Santa Lucia” 
28 
 
                                                          
technical solutions to problems that can cause disasters. This type of disaster 
must be differentiated from an “immediate catastrophe event (like 
earthquake or hurricane), which caused suffering and called for religious 
response and explanation” (1987:34). The most important contribution of 
Kroll-Smith and Couch lies in the idea of defining a disaster as being made 
possible by a systematic failure to provide a technical solution and which 
“has a structure and a pattern of victimization that are not readily adapted to 
local religion” (1987:36).   
 
This definition of chronic technical disaster fits into the narrative of how 
Santa Lucians experienced the disaster. In contrast to other disasters that 
would be considered immediate, the disaster in Santa Lucia was one in 
which the national, regional and local authorities systematically failed - 
from the prevention stage to the closure of the hole in the dam, and 
protecting Santa Lucia from the collapse of the bridge. People expressed 
anger when remembering the words of Governor Verano, days before the 
dam burst, on November 30th - “the south of the department is shielded 
against the Ola Invernal” - and failing to put any machinery in the town to 
reinforce the dam. Similar reactions were seen when considering Mayor 
Santana’s “cowardice” and “nervousness” in managing the situation before, 
during and after the disaster and the contractors’ and regional government’s 
unusual tardiness to close the burst. People also stated frustration over the 
systematic failure to provide a technical solution to the disaster, relating to 
the clear notion of the landscape transformation process which prevented 
mystical interpretation of the disaster.    
 
The lack of a leading divine element in the narrative –or what Kroll-Smith 
and Couch might see as the “irrelevance of the religious meaning” in a 
narrative (1987) – opens other elements as the possible main drivers in the 
narrative. In the case of Santa Lucia, this chronic technical disaster 
perception of the situation also presents an extension of the State’s neglect 
for all aspects of social life in the municipality.  
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Historically, Santa Lucia has been a marginal territory, and in this historical 
marginality the disaster emerged as an opportunity. Without any 
commodities in their territory (e.g.: oil, minerals) that could attract the 
attention of the State, disaster emerges as the only way for Santa Lucia to 
position itself in the State’s scope of attention. The official narrative 
reinforces this kind of interpretation of the disaster as an opportunity for the 
State to fulfill its responsibility. In other words, the lack of attention from 
the State, which made the disaster possible, was now an opportunity for the 
State to be present and promote change. This teleology of the narrative, or 
sense of purpose, frames the disaster for Santa Lucians.   
 
In addition, the presence of Calamar in the narrative made the interpretation 
more complex and distances this paper from Kroll-Smith and Couch’s 
definition of chronic technical disaster, which does not allow for moral 
interpretation of disaster. Calamar embodies the representation of negative 
moral attributions15. Calamar, finding itself at a survival crossroad against 
Santa Lucia, made the decision to sacrifice Santa Lucia. The context of lack 
of attention from the State, which made the disaster possible, became an 
opportunity for the State to be present and for things to change. Finally, 
Calamar was the one responsible for the disaster. 
 
In conclusion, Santa Lucian’s interpretation of the disaster is not a divine 
interpretation of the events, but rather a clear result of the process of 
transformation that had been taking place in the municipality, and the 
authorities’ failure to deal with and prevent the risk. Yet, there is also a 
moral element that enters and underscores the narrative, connected to the 
action (representation) of the neighbor town of Calamar.   
 
 
B. The emergence of vulnerability in Santa Lucia 
15 The representation  of Calamar will be examined in the sub-chapter C” Criminal hands” 
(or the moral condemnation of Calamar) 
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Among the Santa Lucians, there is a strong notion of transformation of the 
landscape that has taken place in their territory during recent decades. This 
process of transformation had produced profound change in the 
socioeconomic structure of the municipality over time.  However, this 
transformation of the landscape also produced risks for the population. This 
sub-chapter will examine the interaction between transformation of the 
landscape and marginality from which the vulnerability of Santa Lucia 
emerges.    
 
Marginality  
Santa Lucia has historically been positioned at the margins. Maps from the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries show how what is now Santa Lucia 
was part of a large system of cienagas16 which connect with the cienaga de 
Matuna, near Cartagena de Indias, during the rainy season (Mogollón Vélez, 
2012:12).  This territory, covered by a multiplicity of cienagas, was a 
perfect place for runaway black slaves (called cimarrones) escaping from 
their slave masters. This territory was therefore referred to as Canoga de 
Negros. The territory remained a marginal place for the subsequent 
centuries, offering no natural resources for regional or national interests, and 
becoming a place where fishermen settled and were able to obtain their 
livelihood from the numerous cienagas that cover the territory.     
 
Despite being the third smallest department with only 3,386 Km² Atlántico 
presents extreme political contrasts within its own territory. Southern 
municipalities of Atlántico have been considered marginal places at the 
regional level. With the highest poverty rate, at between 75% and 55%, the 
southern municipalities of Atlántico (Manatí, Campo de la Cruz, Suan, 
Candelaria and Santa Lucia), experienced great problems in terms of public 
services and lack of state institutional presence (Sanchez Jabba, 2011: 24). 
Two hours north of Santa Lucia, is the regional capital, Barranquilla, which 
offers a completely different landscape.   
 
16 Cienaga is a particular ecosystem similar to a swamp.  
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Barranquilla, known as the “Colombian golden gate”, is a prosperous 
industrial city, which has 1,200,000 inhabitants (Dane, 2010) and continues 
to attract investment for its development and strategic location as a port for 
the Caribbean Sea. In contrast to the alarming poverty rates of the south of 
the department, Barranquilla’s poverty rate reaches only 17%. The 
Barranquilla elite also holds great economic and political clout at the 
national level.       
 
Santa Lucians clearly understand their marginality, as they claim that it was 
the disaster of 2010-2011 that brought them out of the invisibility they 
experienced with respect to the national and regional government. “No one 
had even cared for Santa Lucia before the disaster”, said Jose, a farmer.  
Doña Berta said that, “we are the most southern municipality of the 
department. No one cares about us”. Many Santa Lucians say that the only 
time their invisibility was partially alleviated was during regional elections, 
when politicians eager to access the regional movement visited them, and 
never came back. They then returned to invisibility. 
 
A (short) history of the transformation of the landscape  
Lemaitre examines how the construction of the Canal del Dique was a 
massive project that has aimed to produce a route connecting the Magdalena 
River with the port of Cartagena since the seventeenth century, and 
produced a large ecological transformation of the landscape across the 
territory (Lemaitre, 2010).  Yet in this process of transformation, the most 
dramatic impact on the landscape came from rectification, canalization and 
expansion works during 1923 and 1984 (Mogollon, Velez, 2011: 33).  
Mogollon Velez refers to this transformation as “slow [transformations], 
which were not detected by the affected inhabitants, but which took place 
over many generations; only the elders can remember how a landscape or 
determined geography was before”17 (2011:33).  
 
17 Translated by the author. 
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Matching Mogollón Velez´s observation, among older Santa Lucians there 
exists a notion of transformation of the landscape. The elders express a 
particular event as the main trigger of the transformation: the road/dam18 
built in the 1950s. They still remember how dictator General Gustavo Rojas 
Pinilla, who ruled from 1953 to 1957, was behind the large works that dried 
out the cienagas that surround the town.  
 
However, many Santa Lucians also have the notion of transformation of the 
landscape without experiencing it directly. People of around 50 years old 
made statements such as “my dad told me that he fished right here” or “this 
was all water, in the place where we are now”. Therefore, without actually 
experiencing the landscape transformation, there still exists indirect 
experience through oral tradition.  
 
This transformation of the landscape was marked by the sudden availability 
of land in the municipality. From the dry cienagas emerged lands that 
allowed people in the municipality to consider new sources of income. 
Mamerto, an elder from Santa Lucia, explains, “Rojas Pinilla was the one 
who dried the cienagas. Before then, everyone in town was a fisherman. 
There wasn’t any agriculture at all. All the agriculture was from the town of 
Manatí. They were merchants who brought the food through the cienagas 
by boat. They tied their canoes in what is now Pueblo Nuevo”.    
 
In Santa Lucia, distribution of new lands was conducted according to the 
work capacity of the individual who claimed ownership. Without the 
presence of capital or large landlords in the area, family workforces were 
the only forces available to exploit the land. Therefore, tenure of this new 
land was mainly characterized by smallholding, unlike other dry cienagas, 
especially in the neighboring department of Bolivar. 
 
In the long term, this availability of land transformed the social structure of 
the municipality. The capacity to have land and thereby enter the livestock 
18 The dam has in its top a road  
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and agriculture sector not only increased population income, but also 
produced the capacity to accumulate capital in the territory. The livestock 
sector, especially, also became a way for the Santa Lucians to save and 
invest.  
 
Parallel to these ongoing transformations, migration developed as an 
important livelihood strategy. All municipalities from south of the Atlántico 
have had a strong historic relationship with migration. For Santa Lucians, 
their main migration destination has been Venezuela. The need for cheap 
labor and the high currency exchange between the Venezuelan bolivar and 
Colombian peso increased the number of people from Santa Lucia who 
migrated to the neighboring country. Remittances flowed into the town, 
supporting the households and were transformed into capital through 
investments in cattle. This helped support the economic transformation.  
 
Spatially, the landscape of Santa Lucia transformed after the dam finally 
dried the cienagas that surrounded the town. This transformation led to the 
expansion of the town, creating a periphery in places that just years before 
had been covered by water. People started building their houses in these 
peripheries, for example the neighborhood of Pueblo Nuevo. During the 
nineties some invasiones19 started appearing at the periphery. Si nos dejan 
(If they let us) was one of those invasiones, and was eventually legalized by 
the local authorities.  
 
This spatial expansion of the town needed to be seen from a stratification 
approach, understanding the emergence of the new neighborhoods as the 
rise in demand for housing to serve people who weren’t able to find housing 
in already-established legal neighborhoods. The type of construction also 
varies largely between center and periphery. In the center, houses were 
predominantly made from bricks and cement. On the other hand, in the 
peripheries, houses were more commonly constructed of bahareque.  
 
19 Invasiones are shanty towns 
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 The uneven distribution of risk 
The transformation of the landscape carried with it the possibility for Santa 
Lucians to explore other sources of income, but also implied an uneven 
distribution of risk.  
 
Even though the channel began construction in the seventeenth century, it 
was not until the twentieth century that the most important landscape 
transformations took place due to the area’s rise as a place of national 
interest and economically strategic importance.  The Canal del Dique 
became economic infrastructure for transporting oil from the center of 
Colombia to the refinery center in Cartagena20. According to Mogollón 
Vélez (2012), it is important to differentiate between the “old, small and 
harmless Canal del Dique before 1923, and today’s channel, which is an 
enormous artificial branch of the Magdalena River” (2012:13). 
 
According to Mogollón Velez (2012), 97% of the current Canal del Dique 
was built between 1923 and 1984. Furthermore, in the two last renovations 
and expansions of the channel, the number of curves in the channel 
decreased from 270 to 50, and its width doubled to allow increases in 
transport.  This also dramatically increased the level of sediment carried by 
the channel (2012:16).  Drying the cienagas, as was done in Santa Lucia, 
was a general practice throughout the route of the channel. The large 
cienagas that in the past helped maintain the flooding, disappeared in a 
couple of decades.  Nowadays, 85% of the water flow that enters Calamar 
exits through the bays of Cartagena (2012:13).   
 
The transformation of the landscape, driven by economic interest, resulted 
in the appearance of certain risks. These risks were not shared equally 
among the actors involved in the landscape transformations. Furthermore, 
the risks affected local communities living near the Canal del Dique.  
People across the channel had experienced, and mostly suffered, the 
20 In 2010, from the 2,200,000 tonnes of oil that move though the Magdalena River 
annually, 80% of them go through the Canal del Dique (BID and CEPAL 2012:192). 
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realization of risk from a clear state of neglect of the administration of the 
channel by local, regional and national authorities.  
 
The flood of 2010-2011 was not the only disaster in the Canal del Dique in 
the last few decades.  People in Santa Lucia still remember that the dam 
broke in 1984, at a point close to the one that broke in 2010.  That time, the 
water reached only the rural areas, not the town center. Mamerto21 -the local 
hero responsible for repairing the break the first time – told a story about 
this disaster that more or less reproduced the series of events from the 
flooding 2010-201122.   
 
Santa Lucians are aware of those responsible for increasing the risks they 
face. At the highest level is the State. There is a general consensus about the 
State’s abandonment of dredging works in the channel. Without the 
dredging, the channel’s level had increased due to the large deposits of 
sediment from the Magdalena River.  Oscar, a community leader who also 
worked in the dredging works, commented “it’s been close to 20 years 
without any dredging”. The State is also responsible for not reinforcing the 
dam all across the municipality. As Cristo mentioned, “they start working 
when the creciente starts and it is impossible to work. They need to do the 
work in the verano (dry season)”.  
 
In addition, people are aware of the dry cienagas close to the town as an 
additional risk. Regarding the drying of the cienagas, Santa Lucians 
acknowledge the importance that they had in failing to manage the increase 
of the channel’s water level.  According to Mamerto, “if all the water entries 
21 Mamerto was a living legend in Santa Lucia. Stories about his mythological strength 
were shared among people in the town. The main story about Mamerto was the massive 
amount of material that he lifted and threw into the river to repair the dam during the 1984 
flooding in Santa Lucia, saving the town. Mamerto sadly died by the time the thesis was 
written.  
22 The more detailed story goes: It was a strong rainy season in which the dam burst on the 
road between Calamar and Santa Lucia, in a place called Diquito.  Some people said that 
people from Calamar were responsible for breaking the dam in a desperate act to save their 
own town from the alarming levels of the Magdalena River.  The municipal authority, 
inspector Jose Maria Polo, was overwhelmed by the disaster and ran away, and was only 
found a couple of weeks later in a nearby municipality. The only one who offered some 
assistance during the disaster was the Governor of the time, Fuad Char, who brought 
machinery to the site. 
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(to the cienagas) had been open during the 2010-2011 flooding disaster, the 
damage would be less. All that lands where crying out for water, and water 
always seeks its course”.   
 
In conclusion, we might claim that a dramatic transformation of the 
landscape -which also produced great socioeconomic transformation in the 
social structure of the municipality- was followed by the emergence of risk 
which was not shared equally among the actors involved. Risks emerged 
from the transformation of the landscape, which historically had been 
neglected by the state. The emergence of Santa Lucia’s vulnerability must 
be understood as the juxtaposition between an intensive landscape 
transformation and the marginality of the territory.  
 
C. “Criminal hands” (or the moral condemnation of Calamar ) 
Calamar plays a central role in the Santa Lucians’ narrative of the disaster, 
as being responsible for breaking the dam. This implies the representation 
of Calamar as the embodiment of negative moral attributes for the Santa 
Lucians. This representation needs to be examined closely to understand 
how it is mediated by certain events and historical process.  
 
“It was them or us” 
Established in 1840 as the town of Gamarra, what is now Calamar lies 
between the Magdalena River and the Cienaga de Negros.  At the end of the 
nineteenth century, Calamar was a prosperous town, thanks to a train that 
connected the municipality with a port in the Magdalena River - the city of 
Cartagena. Because of these links to the waterways, Calamar became an 
important merchant center. Those glorious days were over when, in 1952, 
the then-president Roberto Urdaneta Alvarez closed the train between 
Calamar and Cartagena for economic reasons (Lemaitre, 2010).   
 
Still, nowadays, given its strategic location in the River Magdalena and near 
the beginning of the Canal del Dique, Calamar is a social and economic 
center for many communities along the river, in the departments of Bolivar, 
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Atlántico and Magdalena. Daily, numerous canoes and boats dock in this 
port, buying and selling products like fish and fruit. 
 
On account of its location, Calamar has been threatened by disappearance if 
it becomes submerged by the waters of the Magdalena River. As Santa 
Lucians mentioned, during the emergency of 2010-2011, Calamar was at 
very high risk of disappearing because of the increase in the levels of the 
Magdalena River. Calamar, with a 15-meter wall, which protects the town 
from the river, was experiencing rising water levels that exceeded the wall, 
and started pouring into the town.  Santa Lucians believe that the imminent 
destruction of Calamar was the main trigger for its people to decide to break 
the dam at Santa Lucia. One fisherman said, “they [the people of Calamar] 
couldn’t last a few days more. The walls couldn’t resist the water”. Another 
man in the town stated “it was them or us. So they made a decision”.  
 
Santa Lucians say that the Calamar people decided to drop a liquid called 
azogue in the road outside the town. This caused the dam to break, allowing 
the water to enter across from their town. The idea of the “criminal hands” 
behind this act in the disaster is widely shared idea among Santa Lucians. 
 
For Santa Lucians, the way that Calamar managed its risk caused detriment 
to the survival of Santa Lucia.  One elder from the town goes further, 
blaming Calamar for both disasters (1984 and 2011-2012): “every time 
there is a creciente they only think about acting wickedly. They don’t 
understand that people live here”. Jose and Carlos, local fishermen, 
specifically talk about the impact that drying the large cienaga had on Santa 
Lucians. The drying operations took place at the opposite side of the 
channel, in lands belonging to Calamar. These cienagas were useful not 
only as a way to manage increasing levels of water in the channel, but also 
as a source of income for a great number of fishermen in Santa Lucia. The 
former cienaga is now a livestock farm. Carlos stated “I wish that I could 
take back a cienaga for fishing, but what can I do? I am only a fisherman 
against livestock men”.  
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 Hermógenez Ramirez  
A field visit to Calamar was planned, but people in Santa Lucia were really 
concerned and insisted on having a local mototaxista to “dar solo una 
vueltica” (only a small look around the town).  Regardless of the proximity 
and Santa Lucia’s economic dependence on Calamar, people in the 
municipality consider their neighbors in Calamar to be others. Santa 
Lucians use a moral perspective to describe Calamar as a town full of “bad 
people” or “a bad town”.   
 
The strongest presentation of the moral condemnation of Calamar is seen in 
the story of Hermógenez Ramirez, who God sent to the earth23. This story, 
which is not only common among Santa Lucians but is also present in the 
Campo de la Cruz, describes the arrival of a man sent by God to Calamar 
and Campo de la Cruz, or to Santa Lucia in other versions.  
 
According to the story, Hermógenez Ramirez was a short man (“the size of 
a child”, some said) who, according to some, was sent by God to the earth.  
Ramirez arrived in Calamar asking for water and something to eat. The 
people of Calamar started mocking him and even hurting him instead of 
helping him. Ramirez had no other option but to leave the town. However, 
before he left, as punishment for their behavior, he said “This place will no 
longer be called Calamar, but rather Calamities”, condemning the town to 
numerous tragedies. After leaving Calamar, Ramirez reached Santa Lucia 
(or some say Campo de la Cruz) and found food and good people, so he 
blessed those territories. This story was repeated again and again across 
different conversations during fieldwork, with just some small variations, all 
clearly coinciding in the condemnation of Calamar for their immoral 
behavior.  
 
 
23 Apparently the figure of Hermógenez Ramirez is also present in many places in the 
Colombian Caribbean.  For more information about Hermógenez Ramirez see: McGraw, 
Jason (2014) The work of recognition. Caribbean Colombia and the postemancipation 
struggle for citizenship. The University of North Carolina Press.   
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 Calamar as the terror 
Other events mediated with this representation of Calamar. During the late 
90s and early 2000s, Calamar was a place of terror.  Paramilitary groups 
created their headquarters in the municipality, and then expanded their 
domination all across the municipalities of southern Atlántico.  
 
People in Santa Lucia remember those days as really difficult times.  
According to Santa Lucians, the “paras” were brought to Calamar by the 
rich people in town. One Santa Lucian affirmed that “in the beginning, [the 
rich] were trying to clear the town of thieves, especially cattle robbers. They 
started by clearing the town of thieves. But at the end, they themselves 
turned out to be worse than thieves”.  Another Santa Lucian argued “they 
choose Calamar because it’s the place where the money is. Here in Santa 
Lucia, there is none at all. They came to kill”.   
 
The paramilitary boss was the feared and cruel Pambe. After a couple of 
months of operations there, the whole town and region was completely 
under his control. Santa Lucians mentioned how during Pambe´s rule, no-
one from other towns was authorized to enter Calamar. Daring to question 
Pambe’s orders would result in death, and the victims’ bodies would then be 
thrown into the channel passing in front of Santa Lucia. One Santa Lucian 
said that “people entered by the road, and then we saw them leaving down 
the Canal”. There was an explicit order from the paramilitaries that no-one 
could bury the bodies floating down the channel. One older woman 
remembered, “for a time I never looked at the channel. It was so painful. 
There were just bodies passing by”. Even despite the 9km proximity of the 
two towns, for many years Santa Lucians would not dare to enter Calamar.  
 
Nevertheless, the terror was not only restricted to visit Calamar. The 
paramilitary squads often came into Santa Lucia and established curfew 
starting at 8 pm. A woman recalled, “I could leave my chair outside all night 
and next morning they would be there”. However, the biggest fear was the 
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grey pick-up - the car in which the paramilitaries entered at night to kill 
people in Santa Lucia. One man mentioned that “when we saw the grey pick 
up, everyone started running. Someone was going to be killed”.   
 
One of the victims of the grey pick-up’s action was a young politician from 
the town. His nephew remembers how his uncle was a highly appreciated 
young politician who entered local politics without support from the local 
elite. Without a wife or children to maintain, he used his modest salary to 
buy sports equipment for the children in the town. One night, the 
paramilitaries pushed him into the grey pick-up. To this day, his location 
remains unknown.   
 
Finally, “Pambe” was shot during a dispute with another paramilitary group. 
After that, according to the people, the situation improved. With the 
paramilitary demobilization during the administration of Alvaro Uribe 
(2002-2010), some of the local paramilitary leaders, like Caracortada 
(Scarface) entered civilian life through the Justice and Peace process24. 
However, even though Pambe is gone, Santa Lucians still believe that there 
is “gente rara” (strange people”) in Calamar. One lady warns that “if the 
robbery is starting again, they (paramilitaries) could come back again”. 
 
Why blame Calamar for the disaster?  
Without entering the debate about whether the incident with the azogue 
actually took place or not, certain events and historical processes that have 
taken place between the two towns made the idea that Calamar was 
responsible for the disaster plausible for Santa Lucians. These include: the 
drying of the cienaga, which had been the source of income for a large 
number of fishermen in Santa Lucia, and increased the population’s risk 
along the channel; and the brutal rule of the paramilitaries in the town, with 
the horrible victimization that they waged in Santa Lucia.  
24 Justicia y Paz is a transitional justice process created by the Colombian government. It 
dealt with the paramilitary’s demobilization process during the early years of the 
presidency of Alvaro Uribe. In this process, high-ranking members of the paramilitaries 
obtained jail sentences for a maximum of 8 years, if they actively helped in the process of 
establishing justice, trust and relief for the victims of their crimes.     
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 Behind the representation lies the historical subalternity present between 
Calamar and Santa Lucia. Calamar is the municipality with the most 
economic power in the region, and this affects Santa Lucians for better or 
worse. Even the origins of the towns - one as a fishing village and the other 
as a strategic merchant town - mark the historically uneven power 
relationship between them.    
 
Nevertheless, there is a narrow window of justification that Santa Lucians 
open for Calamar, regarding the disaster, which needs to be mentioned. 
Many people say that Calamar “was forced to do that”. This comment 
shows that Santa Lucians, at some level, recognize that Calamar also 
suffered from the lack of maintenance and dredging of the Magdalena 
River. In this matter, they (Calamar and Santa Lucia) both share the State’s 
neglect of the nearby natural resources. Yet, in the historical power structure 
that has marked their relationship, Santa Lucia is always at the bottom. “We 
always end up screwed. When someone needs to pay the price, it is Santa 
Lucia” an elder said. For them, the subalternity of Santa Lucia is shown by 
the fact that whenever there is a choice between “us or them”, Calamar will 
always be the one that’s safe, and no-one will make a case for, or protect, 
Santa Lucia.  
 
D. The liminality of winners and losers     
The narrative about the disaster portrays the strong social structure 
transformation it produced. It is necessary to understand how the disaster 
emerges as an event that transforms the landscape.  From creature to creator 
of the transformation process in the landscape, the flooding, as a totalizing 
event, shocks the entire social structure of the municipality.  
 
The landscape, once a reflection of the social stratification in the town, is 
now completely transformed after the flooding. A new landscape has 
emerged that changes the patterns previously established among Santa 
Lucians. This new landscape is characterized by a shared experience of 
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liminality¸ although it is not free of tensions. This transformation of the 
social structure should be framed as part of a shared rite de passage (Turner, 
1995).       
 
Disasters and rites de passage 
Rites de passage is a concept that defines all processes of social 
transformation that an individual, though his life, experiences (Turner, 
1995: 33). These rites de passage are divided into three particular stages: 
separation, margin and aggregation (Turner, 1995). These different stages 
mark the route through which an individual transitions from one particular 
status to other. The first stage, separation, is marked by a symbolic 
detachment from the previous status or position held in the society. The 
second margin, is characterized by a liminal stage in which the individual is 
assigned “few or none of the attributes of the past or coming state” (Turner, 
1995: 94). It is in this liminality stage that the concept of communitas 
emerges, referring to the horizontal bond and “comradeship” that marks the 
relationship between individuals who share this transition between statuses 
(Turner, 1995:96).  Finally, there is the stage of aggregation in which the 
transitional phase is over, and the liminal identity is relegated to give the 
individual a status, with the rights and obligations implied by the social 
structure (Turner, 1995:96).    
 
The concepts of liminality and communitas have been applied to the study 
of disasters. For Bode (1977), the “social nakedness”, or the “form of 
release or liberation from social structure” that emerges after a disaster can 
be closely related to Turner’s definition of communitas (Bode, 1977: 266). 
Bode’s definition of communitas, applied to a disaster context, “is a vision – 
no matter how transitory - of society as unstructured, undifferentiated, 
equal, whose borders are ideally coterminous with those of the human 
species” (Bode, 1977:266). Bode examines the case of Ancash (Peru), 
connecting this communitas analysis to understanding the sacking that took 
place after a disaster that affected poor farmers, as part of a “ritual of status 
reversal” (Bode, 1977:266).   
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About winners and losers   
“The flooding brought everyone to the lowest common denominator” said 
Reiner, one of the few local merchants.  When people in Santa Lucia talk 
about winners and losers in the disaster, they not only refer to the outcome, 
but also to the process of transformation of status among the individuals. 
The disaster shook the social structure of Santa Lucia by destroying the 
assets that economically, but also symbolically, created social differentiation 
between Santa Lucians. This transformation was marked by three events, 
which we can frame in the different stages of the rite de passage: an initial 
separation stage, marked by the loss of the assets; then a liminal stage, 
marked by the humanitarian assistance that followed the disaster; and then 
an aggregation stage, marked by the effort of trying to get back the lost 
status, but not being able to leave the liminal stage.  
 
There is a strong emotional narrative about how people experienced shock 
to the social structure – the disaster - and the transformation of status it 
implied. “For the rich it was worse”, said a lady from near the plaza. “The 
poor people didn’t suffer as much as the people with money. At the end, 
they [the poor] didn’t have anything to lose”.  
 
Separation stage: the destruction  
The separation stage was marked by the destruction of individuals’ assets. 
The ways in which the destruction took place should be defined in terms of 
the emotional narrative that underlies each of them. The three ways in which 
the assets were destroyed were: flooding (livestock, crops and other houses / 
labor-related assets); “mal vendiendo” (mainly livestock); and sacking 
(mainly houses / labor-related assets). 
 
In terms of what was lost by the flooding, there is an impotent acceptance of 
the overwhelming magnitude of the disaster. Without anyone benefitting 
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from the assets, the narrative highlights the sadness due to the loss of capital 
and work deposited in those assets.  In contrast, about what was “mal 
vendido” and what was sacked, there is a moral narrative. Regarding what 
was “mal vendido” there was a sense of unfairness in the transaction, and a 
question about the morality of the individuals involved; how they could 
have participated in such a despicable activity, taking advantage of people 
in need.  Again the image of people from Calamar (and Bolivar more 
generally) appears as taking part in those immoral transactions.  
 
Furthermore, the moral condemnation of sacking practices was even more 
drastic. Even if what was sacked consisted of a small part of the 
redistribution of wealth – following Bode’s (1977) idea of “ritual of status 
reversal” - the intense moral condemnation of the practice is highlighted by 
the repeated mentions of people from the town who benefited from the 
disaster. The idea of benefit from disaster emerges as similar to the buyers 
in “mal vendiendo” practices, as a morally condemnable activity.  
 
The sacking activities that took place during and after the disaster remain an 
open wound for the people of Santa Lucia. One lady said, “After the sacking 
I started to mistrust everyone around me”. However, there weren’t any 
direct sanctions for the sackers. Another man mentioned that “everyone 
knows who they are, the ones who ransacked. Right now they have two or 
three TVs, when in the past they wouldn’t have had a single one”. For some 
Santa Lucians, the disaster was therefore a way to highlight the immorality 
of some of the town’s inhabitants. Even though it is not explicitly said in the 
interviews, it was implicitly stated that sacking was an activity conducted by 
low status individuals.  
 
Marginal stage: Everyone in the same line 
The marginal stage for Santa Lucians was represented by the experiences of 
high and low status individuals who were forced to share outside traditional 
structural patterns. Santa Lucians, immersed in the liminality of a stage in 
which they didn’t have their usual status, experienced their surroundings 
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differently. Two particular stories told during fieldwork exemplify the 
perspectives and tensions that emerged in Santa Lucia when individuals 
found themselves facing this new situation. 
 
In the first story, Doña Gripi, a beloved matriarch, said that, “I thought that 
some of the people in the town were just skinny. But then, after the disaster 
when the aid started to appear, people started to get chubby. It was then that 
I understood that people were not skinny, in the past people were just 
starving”. Doña Gripi, from Barrio Bajo, wasn’t aware of hunger being such 
a large issue for some of her neighbors before the disaster. When everyone 
was eating the same food as it was distributed as part of aid assistance, the 
inequality that had been invisible or normalized in the past, became more 
visible and clear to everyone. This kind of experience might be categorized 
as an empathizing experience from this stage of liminality following the 
disaster.  
 
The other story shows the tensions that underline this liminality process in 
Santa Lucia25. A rich lady from the town was queuing for food after the 
disaster, when suddenly a poor lady asked her: “Why are you here?” to 
which the rich lady replied, “Me? Well, I lost more than you”. In contrast to 
the first story, this story shows more clear confrontation and greater lack of 
empathy between the individuals, when they were placed in this new 
context. This contrast deserves further analysis.  
 
First, the poor lady, seeing the rich lady in the line, questioned the 
legitimacy of the other woman’s claim for help. The poor lady refused to 
acknowledge the disaster as capable of reducing the social distance that had 
marked their differences previous to the flooding. For her, the rich lady 
should have had enough resources to support herself, despite the disaster. 
Aid must be delivered to the poor who have no safety nets and therefore 
have greater need. This comment demonstrates denial by low status 
individuals, who are unwilling to accept the lowering of those who had 
25 This story was told by Doña Queta, the owner of the restaurant in town.  
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formerly had a higher status than them, in the liminal context that followed 
the disaster.  
 
On the other hand, the rich lady responded to the poor lady, “Well, I lost 
more than you” - a phase that expresses the opposite view of the disaster.  
For the rich lady, poor people always live in need. This new experience, 
which some describe as being new poor, appears when the needs of the rich 
can no longer be satisfied under the current conditions.  Furthermore, 
suffering is directly mediated by the process of losing status – the 
separation stage mentioned previously - and without going through the 
process of loss, there is no significant experience of suffering. Therefore, 
the larger quantity of assets these people had, the greater the loss and the 
greater the suffering. Here we can see how some high status individuals in 
Santa Lucia examine the tragedy that emerged from their loss of status after 
the disaster.  
 
Aggregation stage: The “unfairness” of the reconstruction 
People with a previously high status took the position that the state should 
respond and take responsibility for reconstruction. This marks the extension 
of the liminality stage. One lady complained, “For the person who loses a 
cow, the State can give one or two. But I lost 40, how many are they 
planning to give me? The same: one or two”. In this matter, the 
reconstruction efforts failed to reproduce the previous social structure. As a 
result, the policies created and even exacerbated a more horizontal social 
structure, thereby intensifying the liminality stage. Beyond good intentions, 
this element is further marked by the need for a homogeneous process to 
characterize state response.  Doña Queta tells the story about how everyone 
in the town received two jars of paint for their entranceway. For some 
houses that was enough, but the biggest houses couldn’t finish the job.   
 
This extension of liminality can be argued by proving that poor people in 
Santa Lucia lacked basic services like housing, and are now benefiting from 
the aid. The Bahareque houses were removed from the landscape of Santa 
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Lucia, and now new stilt houses are starting to cover a good part of Pueblo 
Nuevo. People in Si nos dejan are also finally capable of having sturdier, 
brick-built (not bahareque) or even stilt houses. Furthermore, families that 
lived in overcrowded houses also found the opportunity to own a house of 
their own. 
 
In Santa Lucia, reconstruction works therefore overlap with long-due basic 
infrastructure efforts. More than reconstruction, there is construction taking 
place in Santa Lucia.  “The poor are now having what they never had”, said 
Reiner. This transformation of the landscape reduced the gaps between 
center and periphery in Santa Lucia. Now the periphery is an active place of 
works and infrastructure. Brand new houses, roads and sport facilities, like 
the football and softball field, which are under construction in Pueblo 
Nuevo, show the transformation of the spatial social landscape after the 
disaster.   
 
E. The well-oiled machine (or the local political power) 
Disasters as totalizing events directly affect the way that power relationships 
are established in society (Oliver-Smith, 1996: 309- 310). However, 
disasters don’t inevitably lead to the complete transformation of those 
power arrangements. Furthermore, in some cases, disaster can also 
strengthen the previous set of power arrangements.  In the case of Santa 
Lucia, unpopular Mayors with outrageous track records of corruption 
increased their power after the disaster, and people perceived them as being 
unbeatable in the next elections. Why does Santa Lucia feel hopeless to the 
perpetuation of an elite they define as corrupt and cowardly – an elite that 
has no interest in the town?  
 
The inherency of corruption in the politics  
For Santa Lucians, politics is a smear campaign. It is possible that the 
historical marginality suffered by the municipality taught them that the main 
motivation for entering politics is not to represent the collective interest, but 
rather to obtain wealth. Corruption remains an inherent part of politics in the 
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local and regional political arena. A local lady was asked for her opinion on 
the subject of why don’t things change, and why a new leader doesn’t run 
against the mayor in the next elections.  She replied:   “I don’t trust in 
leaders. Here, all leaders work solely for themselves”.   
 
This representation of Santa Lucians’ belief in the inherency of corruption 
in politics is best portrayed in a statement from a lady asked who she 
considered to be the last good mayor in Santa Lucia. She replied that 
Norberto Medina, a mayor during the 80s, “stole, but the important thing is 
that he did things. The others just stole”. Another lady also tried to justify 
Mayor Ariza’s actions by saying “he can steal, but he’s such a good person 
when you talk with him”.  
 
In Santa Lucia, as in many parts of Colombia, a vote is the most precious 
commodity a poor person has. Large quantities of money are spent to keep 
the political elite in power. However, this quantity “invested” is recovered 
through the control the politicians gain over municipal resources. It’s a 
common understanding among Santa Lucians that many of them sell their 
vote, even though no-one can provide specific cases of people who actually 
did.  
 
“Everyone lives from politics” 
However, the power of the local elite doesn’t depend solely on purchasing 
votes. They also hold the power to control employment opportunities 
through public procurement.  These contracts are completely controlled by 
the Mayor, who assigns them as he wishes, without regulation from state 
authorities. The lack of economically viable activities in Santa Lucia makes 
municipal contracts the only hope for making a living. “Here everyone lives 
from politics. There is nothing more than that”, said a Santa Lucian. 
Younger generations, better educated and more influenced by urban culture, 
are looking for different sources of income than agriculture. In the current 
context of Santa Lucia, finding a position in municipal politics appears to be 
their only option, other than informal mototaxismo.  
49 
 
 Younger generations are not the only ones who desire a contract with the 
municipality. With an alarming rate of unemployment, any contract in the 
municipality represents the capacity to make a living. People vote with the 
fear, or hope, of having or losing their contract. Yet having a contract 
doesn’t translate to economic stability. Regardless of the abundant resources 
administered in the municipality, people stated that the municipality owes 
its employees more than six months of salary. Johan, a local mototaxista, 
mentioned that for him it is better to remain a mototaxista than to work for 
the municipality. He said that he prefers earning 20,000 pesos daily (8 
USD), than working for the municipality and waiting months to get paid.   
 
The economic crisis that followed the disaster created a dearth of 
employment in the municipality. With the crisis in agriculture and livestock, 
the disappearing canal fishing, and the increasing arrival of residents from 
Venezuela, things are not looking easy ahead. State reconstruction efforts 
turned the focus to construction work, but failed to provide other economic 
options for the population. People in Santa Lucia fear that when the 
construction works finish, the economic crisis is going to be even worse.  
 
Oiling the machinery 
According to the Santa Lucians, the disaster was an incredible opportunity 
for politicians. With a clear tendency towards corruption, the flows of state 
resources that followed the disaster were more than a blessing for them. 
Some people go a little further, claiming that the destruction of the town 
was a way for politicians to clear themselves of past charges of corruption.     
 
This direct cash flow provided the opportunity for the local political elite to 
steal cash directly, but this was not enough to keep them in power. The 
disaster context made it possible for them to intensify their traditional 
corrupt practices. The disaster offered them resources for oiling (and 
expanding) their machinery: more vote buying and contract assigning. 
Bigger resources transform into a more efficient way of running the 
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business. More money to “invest”, and more “returns”. With even more 
poverty, and the destruction of the weak economy following the disaster, 
money or contracts turn out to be more powerful than ever.   
 
 
 
Conclusion: A three act meta-narrative of the disaster 
 
The concept of meta-narrative used in this section must be explained. 
Beyond the traditional concept of meta-narrative as a “grand theory” (i.e.: 
marxism, structuralism, among others), the sense in which this concept is 
used here is narrower, and its interpretation is framed as the story about the 
story. This meta-narrative emerges from a re-reading of the local narrative 
about the disaster, understanding deep political, social, economic and 
cultural dimensions that shape it.   
 
This meta-narrative is a three-act story about the transformation of the 
landscape: an initial stage in which this landscape is shaped in a certain 
way; a second stage, in which the landscape is shaken; and finally, a third 
stage, in which this landscape is reshaped. It is also a way of 
conceptualizing disaster as creatures / creators (paraphrasing Sartre´s 
famous quote) of the particular landscape. This coincides with Oliver-
Smith’s (1996) definition of disaster as both process and event. 
 
First Act: transforming the landscape 
The first stage is a transformation of the landscape, which also produced 
large social transformations in Santa Lucia. This historically marginal 
territory experienced a profound landscape transformation process, starting 
in the first decades of the twentieth century. Land was suddenly available in 
a previous cienaga ecosystem. Land availability triggered two occurrences 
in the territory: a transformation in the socioeconomic structure of the 
municipality, and new capacity for capital accumulation.  
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The availability of land made possible the transition from fishing economy 
to agriculture/livestock economy. Those new sources of income increased 
profit for individuals. During the fishing-focused stages of Santa Lucian 
society, the lack of capital in the municipality limited the workforce; this 
new available land permitted the capacity to provide more income. New 
land provided the proper landscape for the accumulation of capital, 
something that wasn’t possible in the fishing economy. Livestock provided 
the perfect receptor for capital and remittances. This capital also created a 
division in the social structure, which in the past had been more or less flat. 
The landscape of the municipality then started expressing this social 
differentiation. An emerging periphery appeared in the landscape of Santa 
Lucia, with housing on the new land surrounding the town. 
 
Yet, in what might be considered a positive transformation, the process of 
modification of the landscape also consolidated some risks. Bigger and 
more powerful national interests, such as providing crucial infrastructure for 
commodity exchange, transformed the landscape, radically changing its 
ecosystem. This risk was not equally shared among the different actors, yet 
it was manifested in the riverside municipalities of the Canal del Dique. 
This risk was also increased by the State’s neglect regarding the upkeep of 
the channel and the dam, which was meant to protect the inhabitants of the 
area. However, for Santa Lucia, this risk among the riverside municipalities 
was not shared in equal terms. Calamar, the neighbor municipality, has 
always faced the bigger risk. 
 
The historical subalternity of Santa Lucia with respect to Calamar is marked 
by their differences.  Calamar, a former important port city in the 
Magdalena River, and the beginning of the Canal del Dique, is a crucial 
merchant center for riverside towns in Atlántico, Bolivar and Magdalena. 
The subalternity of Santa Lucia with respect to Calamar marked Santa 
Lucians’ representation of Calamar as the embodiment of negative moral 
attributes. This representation has been strengthened by certain events and 
historical processes such as the drying of cienaga, which was fundamental 
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to the livelihood of fishermen of Santa Lucia, and has been the focus of the 
paramilitary squads that controlled the zone for years. 
 
Second Act: Shocking the landscape 
The second act is marked by the shock to the landscape. The flood, 
understood as a totalizing event, completely shook the landscape and the 
social structure that were produced during the transformation process. The 
disaster, a creature of the transformation process, emerged as the creator of a 
new transformation of the landscape.    
 
Regarding the events of November 30th when the dam broke, Santa Lucians 
believe there is a juxtaposition of elements. First is the marginality in which 
the State had placed not only the administration of the channel, but also the 
general aspects of the territory. Second, the subalternity towards Calamar, 
which is made evident by Calamar choosing to save itself and break the dam 
regardless of Santa Lucia´s luck. There is no attempt to create any mystical 
interpretation of the disaster.  Regardless of Santa Lucians’ disposition to 
consider the flood as a chronical technical disaster, there is a trace of 
suffering, which needs to be understood and explained from a moral 
perspective. The representation of Calamar, as the embodiment of all 
negative moral attributions, suits that purpose.    
 
The disaster, emerging from the landscape transformation, produces a 
sudden and radical transformation of the landscape and the social structure 
linked to it.  This landscape had produced certain social structure 
differentiations, such as the availability of land and the capacity to 
accumulate capital, and was now completely covered by water, and the 
capital invested in it was destroyed. This destruction took place in three 
differentiated processes / stages - losses, mal vendiendo and sacking - which 
produced differentiated moral / emotional narrative around the Santa 
Lucians.       
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The destruction of capital led to a liminality process in the municipality, 
which emerged after the disaster. The former more hierarchical social 
structure of the municipality, which placed former high status individuals 
alongside low status individuals, was transformed into a more flat social 
structure, in which all individuals needed state aid and support agencies. 
This liminal process wasn’t only excluded from tensions, but also from 
learning to the individuals. Tensions were marked by the emotional 
experiences that former high-status individuals had while adapting to their 
new status. Also, former low-status individuals also questioned the truth of 
this transformation from high to low status, believing it to be a strategy for 
accessing aid. Yet, this liminality process also unveiled certain inequalities 
that had been completely invisible in the past. 
 
Third Act: Reshaping the landscape 
The reconstruction processes that followed were marked by the continuity 
of the liminality process. Beyond a reconstruction process, what took place 
in Santa Lucia was the arrival of public services and state investment in 
items that were not destroyed, but rather had been completely absent prior to 
the disaster. The State provided housing projects for people, who in the past 
lacked decent housing, or did not have a house at all.   
 
However, reconstruction has failed to reactivate the municipal economy. 
The capital invested in the landscape before the disaster hasn’t recovered. 
Reconstruction efforts provide temporary employment, which will finish 
when the planned works are concluded. Without remittances from 
Venezuela, there is nothing in the municipality that can drive the economy 
and replace the capital in the landscape.   
 
Surprisingly, outside the liminality process, the local political elite emerges 
stronger from the disaster.  A disgraced and corrupt elite continues to 
manipulate the opportunities that the disaster offers them. Support from the 
great flow of resources that enters the municipality after the disaster helps to 
oil the machinery, increasing the politicians’ vote-buying and public 
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procurement power. Without any kind of economic activity in the 
municipality, the capacity to make strategic decisions on employment, or 
the fact that they have money to buy votes, gives them the perfect way to 
stay in command.  
 
 (Epilogue): After the opportunity… 
Santa Lucians fear that the historic opportunity to overcome the 
marginality, granted by the disaster, will soon wane. Yes, there are less 
bahareque houses, however, many feel even worse than before the disaster 
struck. Santa Lucians think there are too many bricks in the street and too 
much hunger in the houses.  Reconstruction is an illusion in which a new 
life was offered; yet sadly not delivered. 
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Annex  
 
Annex 1. Photos  
 
 
Bahareque house´s 
 
 
Dry trees years after the flooding 
 
   
New houses build by the State after the flooding   
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The Calamar wall that almost collapsed during the Ola Invernal 
 
 
Mr. Mamerto  
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